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Abstract—Wash trade refers to the activities of traders who 
utilise deliberately designed collusive transactions to increase the 
trading volumes for creating active market impression. Wash 
trade can be damaging to the proper functioning and integrity of 
capital markets. Existing work focuses on collusive clique 
detections based on certain assumptions of trading behaviours. 
Effective approaches for analysing and detecting wash trade in a 
real-life market have yet to be developed. This paper proposes a 
new analysis approach for abstracting the basic structures of 
wash trade based on the network topology theory and a novel 
approach for detecting wash trade activities. The evaluation 
experiments conducted on four NASDAQ stocks suggest that 
wash trade actions can be effectively identified based on the 
proposed algorithm. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Surveillance of financial exchange markets for preventing 
market abuse activities has been attracting more attention from 
academic and industry since the financial crisis in 2008 and 
especially since the flash crash in 2010. One major form of 
market abuse is wash trade, which occurs when the same 
individuals or a group of collusive clients are on both the 
selling and buying sides of a transaction, therefore there is no 
beneficial change in ownership of the traded financial 
instruments. By the non-bona fide collusive transactions, wash 
trade has the effect of creating a misleading appearance of an 
active interest in the stock [1]. Most of the existing related 
literature empirically studies the collusive cliques based on 
some certain assumptions of the “activity similarity”. Very few 
studies address the analysis of the features of different wash 
trade scenarios and the corresponding detection approaches.  
To conduct a wash trade, traders usually set up an 
agreement to construct a network and then trade following the 
connection. The network can simply be comprised of only one 
or two traders and can also be comprised of a lot of traders 
connecting in complex hierarchies. Therefore, discovering the 
collusive network is crucial for detecting wash trade activities. 
We propose a novel detection approach that considers a 
complete spectrum of the problem. In this approach, the 
collusive structure of a wash trade is analysed and summarised 
based on the network topology theory. A recursive algorithm is 
then proposed based on the analysis of the network topology. 
To apply the algorithm, the trading records are aggregated and 
then sorted according to the traded volumes. Substantial 
experiments are conducted on real data from primary 
NASDAQ market for testing the practicability in real-life. The 
obtained results show the effectiveness of the proposed 
algorithm on discovering the wash trade activities. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 
II provides a brief review of wash trade manipulation and the 
corresponding detection methods. The structure of the wash 
trade transactions is analysed in Section III as well as the 
detection algorithm and the pre-organization scheme. 
Experimental evaluation of the proposed approach is provided 
in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and 
discusses potential improvements and future work.  
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
Wash trade intends to increase market transaction volume, 
with the aim of giving the impression of active stock activities. 
The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) defines wash trade 
as a sale or purchase action where there is no change in 
beneficial interest or market risk, or where the transfer of 
beneficial interest or market risk is only between parties acting 
in concert or in collusion, other than for legitimate reasons [2]. 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 
further indicates that a wash trade is the deliberate arrangement 
in concert or collusion [3].  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no reported work on 
the detection of wash trade activities in capital markets. The 
only research that comes close is the work on the detection of 
collusive cliques based on similar trading behaviours, which 
are defined as the members of cliques buying (or selling) 
certain equities in a similar way. A spectral clustering based 
approach was developed [4], where a trading-behaviours 
network is generated and any behaviour that deviates from the 
network is reported as irregularities. The assumption of this 
work is the strong consistence of a trader’s current behaviours 
and his/her previous trading network. A graph clustering 
algorithm for detecting a set of collusive traders has been 
proposed [5]. The relationship between traders is constructed 
as a stock flow graph, and those with “heavy trading” within 
their network are clustered as collusion set. A new approach to 
the correlation matrix of one trading day was presented in 
recent work [6], where trader behaviours are represented by an 
“aggregated time series of signed volumes” of submitted 
orders. The similarities in behaviour between two or more 
traders are measured using Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation coefficient. If the correlation coefficient is larger 
than a user-specified threshold, the corresponding traders are 
considered a potential collusive clique. 
To date, academic research has mainly focused on the 
detection of trading collusions according to analogous trading 
behaviours [5] [6], which were defined by aggregated order 
sequences across various stocks. Detecting the overall 
behaviours across different stocks can hardly reach a 
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conclusion with a precise and determinable manipulation 
activity on a certain instrument. Thus the detected collusions 
only show a collective correlation between their trading 
sequences rather than a particular wash trade action. In the 
meantime, the regulations [2] [3] in recent years broadened the 
gap between the requirements and the lack of an effective wash 
trade detection tool. However, there is no reported work on the 
analysis of wash trade behaviour or a detection approach 
covering a complete spectrum of wash trade tactics. Given the 
gap in the field, it is this aspect of market manipulation that the 
paper seeks to address. 
III. WASH TRADE AND ITS DETECTION 
As the FSA and CESR pointed out in their consultation 
reports [2] [3] that it is hard to distinguish a wash trade because 
the format of trading collusions varies and the collusive 
transactions can be buried in mass numbers of normal trading 
records. The basic structure of collusive transactions is 
theoretically defined as a single trader simultaneously buying 
and selling [2] [3] and sale (or purchase) of blocks of shares 
through multiple traders as passing the parcel between them 
[7]. In practice, the collusive trading can be more complex than 
the basic two definitions, e.g., a complex mesh transaction 
network reported by Nanex on 31 May 2013 [8]. The lack of 
accurate formulation of the collusive transaction network led to 
the scarcity of effective wash trade detection tools. 
Wash trades can be carried out by either one single trader 
or multiple traders [5] [6] [7]. The arrangement of one or 
various traders in a trading collusion is essentially analogous to 
a logically topological structure of various nodes in a network 
[9]. The analogy can be summarized as: 
x The network topology is comprised of a number of 
nodes, which pass data to each other along the 
connections. The trading collusion contains numbers 
of traders, who buy or sell certain stocks following the 
specific connection agreement. 
x The network in reality is complex and is usually 
composed of several basic network topologies [9]. 
The basic trading collusion is defined while the 
collusive transactions in the market are more 
complicated and might be explained as the hybrid of 
the basic formats.  
Therefore, the transactions among traders within a collusion 
network can be analysed by the network topology theory. The 
analysis aims to identify the most basic structures that 
comprise the complex network and build the detection 
approach according to the basic structure. 
A study of network topology identifies five most common 
topologies, bus, ring, star, tree and mesh [10]. A trading 
transaction occurs between a seller and a buyer (point-to-point 
connection in a topology). The bus topology, where each node 
connects to a shared bus instead of another node, does not fulfil 
the trading context. Therefore, we analyse the wash trade 
scenario by a collusive network of four different topologies: 
ring, star, tree and mesh. 
A. Wash trade topologies 
1) Ring topology 
Ring topology with only one node is the simplest network. 
It shows the basic wash trade format: one single trader “A” 
simultaneously buying and selling identical shares of a stock 
[2] [3] as illustrated in Fig. 1.  
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Fig. 1 Wash Trade - single trader.  
Additional to the basic “single-trader” format, a wash trade can 
also be carried out among a network of  ܰ traders. Let’s 
set ܰ = 7 as the example in our following analysis. 
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Fig. 2 Ring topology of seven traders. 
In a ring topology wash trade scenario with multiple 
traders, every trader connects to exactly two other trading 
neighbours forming a single continuous pathway for 
transactions through each trader in one single direction (either 
“clockwise” or “counter clockwise”) with each trader along the 
way handling every selling and buying action. This is defined 
as “passing the parcel” in [7].  After a complete transaction 
loop, the beneficial interest has been transferred across the 
collusive group and no traders in the collusion have an actual 
position change. An example of wash trade transactions 
following the ring topology in Fig. 2 is illustrated in Table 1, 
where Δv is defined as a small positive number of volume. The 
traded volumes between any two neighbours are not 
necessarily 100% identical since the “smart manipulators” 
usually design the transaction volumes to be “mostly identical” 
(for example 98%) for standing aside from the regulatory 
inspections [7]. The difference ( Δv ) (for example 100%-
98%=2%) can then be defined as the matching margin. The 
time intervals between the transactions, shown in the column T 
diff in Table 1, can be varied as random events. The 
transactions occurring at distinct time points may increase the 
risk of financial loss from price fluctuation, but at the same 
time, the decrease the possibility of being recognized by the 
regulator monitoring. 
Table 1 AN EXAMPLE OF RING TOPOLOGY WASH TRADE 
TRANSACTION 
Transaction Seller Buyer Volume ID Time T diff (min.) 
Tଵ 09:00:00 - A B 1500 ± Δv 
Tଶ 09:25:00 25 B C 1500 ± Δv 
Tଷ 09:45:00 20 C D 1500 ± Δv 
Tସ 10:20:00 35 D E 1500 ± Δv 
Tହ 10:35:00 15 E F 1500 ± Δv 
T଺ 10:59:00 24 F G 1500 ± Δv 
T଻ 11:25:00 26 G A 1500 ± Δv 
 
Consider the “parcel passing” trading examples among the 
collusive traders A, … , G in Table 1, the transaction T୩ between 
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traders t୧ and t୨ (t୧, t୨ ∈ {A, … , G}) with traded volume V ± Δv, 
can be defined as: 
 ௞ܶ = ൛ݐ௜, ݐ௝ൟ௏±୼௩, (1) 
Further, representing the buying and selling actions by positive 
and negative signs respectively, transaction Tଵ (A selling to B 
1500 ± Δݒ  shares of stock) in Table 1 can be formulated 
as ଵܶ = {−ܣ, +ܤ}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩. The trader with the trading (buying 
or selling) signs can be called a “signed trader”. Similarly, 
other transactions can be formulated as: 
ଶܶ = {−ܤ, +ܥ}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩, 
… 
଻ܶ = {−ܩ, +ܣ}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩. 
In a wash trade, the transactions among the collusive 
traders ought to bring no changes in beneficial interest for each 
party, which means that the overall effect of transactions 
among the traders in a collusion network equates to nobody 
buying or selling (no positions change). The effects of two 
transactions between two collusive traders ݐ௜ and ݐ௝ add up as 
follows: 
 
൛−ݐ௜, +ݐ௝ൟ௏±୼௩ + ൛+ݐ௜, −ݐ௝ൟ௏±୼௩ 
= ൛−ݐ௜ + ݐ௜+ݐ௝ − ݐ௝ൟ௏±୼௩ 
= {0 , 0}௏±୼௩ = {0}. 
(2) 
Based on this, the effect of the transactions in Table 1 can 
be expressed as 
 ෍ ௞ܶ
଻
௞ୀଵ
= ෍ ൛−ݐ௜, +ݐ௝ൟ௏±୼௩
௧೔,௧ೕ∈{஺,…,ீ}
= {0} (3) 
The transactions result in a zero-sum situation where there 
are no changes in beneficial interest for each party in a ring 
topologic collusive network. 
2) Star topology 
The star transaction topology features a “host” trader (ܣ in 
Fig. 3 left) and a number of “device” traders (ܤ, … , G in Fig. 3 
left) connecting only with host. Since there are no connections 
among the “device”, the “device” traders’ positions can be 
maintained if and only if each “device” trader equalises its 
sales and purchases with the “host” respectively. The two 
headed arrows in Fig. 3 illustrate the bi-directional transactions 
between two neighbours. An example of wash trade following 
the star topology is shown in Table 2 and is formulated as 
ଵܶ = {−ܣ, +ܤ}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩, ଶܶ = {−ܤ, +ܣ}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩, 
ଷܶ = {−ܣ, +ܥ}ଶହ଴଴±୼௩, ସܶ = {−ܥ, +ܣ}ଶହ଴଴±୼௩, 
… 
ଵܶଵ = {−ܣ, +ܩ}ଷ଴଴଴±୼௩, ଵܶଶ = {−ܩ, +ܣ}ଷ଴଴଴±୼௩ 
The effect of the transactions can be calculated by 
summarizing the transactions with the same volume. This 
involves splitting those transactions into blocks of similar 
traded volume  ௟ܸ ± Δݒ and calculating the summary in each 
block separately: 
 
෍ ௞ܶ
ଵସ
௞ୀଵ
= ෍ ൛−ݐ௜, +ݐ௝ൟ௏೗±୼௩
௧೔,௧ೕ∈{஺,…,ீ}
 
= {−ܣ, +ܤ}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩ + {−ܤ, +ܣ}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩ 
    +{−ܣ, +ܥ}ଶହ଴଴±୼௩ + {−ܥ, +ܣ}ଶହ଴଴±୼௩ 
    … 
    +{−ܣ, +ܩ}ଷ଴଴଴±୼௩ + {−ܩ, +ܣ}ଷ଴଴଴±୼௩ 
= {0}ଵହ଴଴±୼௩ + {0}ଶହ଴଴±୼௩ + ⋯ + {0}ଷ଴଴଴±୼௩ 
= {0} 
(4) 
It is obviously that: if the traders arrange a wash trade 
following the star network topology, their transactions between 
any two connected neighbours simply follow a ring topology 
with two traders (e.g., ܣ ↔ ܤ as shown in Fig. 3 right part). 
Therefore, the star topology can be also observed as 
combinations of a number of “two-trader” ring topologies. 
A
B C
DG
EF
B
A
   
Fig. 3 Star topology with seven traders (left); equivalent “2-trader” ring 
topology (right). 
 
Table 2 AN EXAMPLE OF STAR TOPOLOGY WASH TRADE 
TRANSACTION 
Transaction Seller Buyer Volume ID Time T diff (min.) 
Tଵ 09:00:00 - A B 1500 ± Δv 
Tଶ 09:25:00 25 B A 1500 ± Δv 
Tଷ 09:45:00 20 A C 2500 ± Δv 
Tସ 11:25:00 26 C A 2500 ± Δv 
… 
Tଵଵ 15:25:00 - A G 3000 ± Δv 
Tଵଶ 16:00:00 35 G A 3000 ± Δv 
 
3) Tree topology 
Basic tree topology is based on the hierarchy of nodes as 
shown in Fig. 4(a). The highest level of any tree consists of a 
single “root” node (A in Fig. 4(a)) connected to either single or 
multiple nodes in the level below by point-to-point links. The 
lower level nodes are also connected to single or multiple 
nodes in the next level down [9] [10] and the nodes at lowest 
level are termed as “leaf” nodes (D, E, F and G in Fig. 4(a)).  
It is difficult to finish a wash trade based only on the tree 
topology, because, within a hierarchy structure, the “root” 
trader can only sell to the traders at lower level while the “leaf” 
traders can only buy from the higher levels, thus they cannot 
maintain unchanged trading positions. For example, in the 
basic tree topology in Fig. 4(a), assuming each transaction has 
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the same traded volumes, the transactions between the 
connected nodes can be formulated as 
ଵܶ = {−ܣ, +ܤ}௏±୼௩, ଶܶ = {−ܤ, +ܦ}௏±୼௩, 
ଷܶ = {−ܤ, +ܧ}௏±୼௩, ସܶ = {−ܣ, +ܥ}௏±୼௩, 
ହܶ = {−ܥ, +ܨ}௏±୼௩, ଺ܶ = {−ܥ, +ܩ}௏±୼௩. 
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(a)                                     (b)                                    (c) 
Fig. 4 (a) Tree topology of seven traders; (b) Tree topology of seven 
traders with bi-directional paths with; (c) Tree transaction topology of 
seven traders with loop paths. 
 
According to Equation (3), the total of those transactions is 
 
෍ T୩
଺
୩ୀଵ
= {−2A − B + D + E − C + F + G}௏±୼௩ (5) 
To successfully accomplish the wash trade, more transactions 
are required to balance the remaining positions. There are two 
solutions for this. The first one is to simply add six more 
transactions as: 
଻ܶ = {−ܤ, +ܣ}௏±୼௩, ଼ܶ = {−ܦ, +ܤ}௏±୼௩, 
ଽܶ = {−ܧ, +ܤ}௏±୼௩, ଵܶ଴ = {−ܥ, +ܣ}௏±୼௩, 
ଵܶଵ = {−ܨ, +ܥ}௏±୼௩, ଵܶଶ = {−ܩ, +ܥ}௏±୼௩. 
Aggregating the six transactions with ∑ T୩଺୩ୀଵ , the sum is then 
changed to: 
 
෍ ௞ܶ
଺ା଺
௞ୀଵ
= ෍ T୩
଺
୩ୀଵ
+ ෍ T୩
ଵଶ
୩ୀ଻
 
= {−2A − B + D + E − C + F + G}௩±୼௩ 
    +{2ܣ + ܤ − ܦ − ܧ + ܥ − ܨ − ܩ}௩±୼௩ 
= {0}௏±୼௩. 
(6) 
If illustrated in Fig. 4(a), the six added transactions actually 
change the tree connection to bi-directional as shown in Fig. 
4(b). 
The second solution is to remove the assumption of “same 
traded volumes” and maintain the balanced positions for the 
traders at intermediate level (e.g., B and C in Fig. 4(a)). Thus 
the transactions ଵܶ, … , ଺ܶ are modified as: 
 
ଵܶ = {−ܣ, +ܤ}ଶ௏±୼௩, ଶܶ = {−ܤ, +ܦ}௏±୼௩, 
ଷܶ = {−ܤ, +ܧ}௏±୼௩, ସܶ = {−ܣ, +ܥ}ଶ௏±୼௩, 
ହܶ = {−ܥ, +ܨ}௏±୼௩, ଺ܶ = {−ܥ, +ܩ}௏±୼௩. 
(7) 
An aggregate operation for two transactions with at least 
one identical “signed trader” (same trader with same buy/sell 
sign refers to identical trader e.g. {+A} is identical to {+A} but 
not to {−A}) can be written as: 
 
෠ܶ = ௞ܶభ + ௞ܶమ  
= ൛+ݐ௜, −ݐ௝ൟ௏భ±୼௩ + ൛+ݐ௜, −ݐ௝ൟ௏మ±୼௩ 
= ቄ[+ݐ௜]௏భା௏మ±୼௩ , ൣ−ݐ௝൧௏భା௏మ±୼௩ቅ. 
(8) 
For example, the aggregation ෠ܶଶ,ଷ of transactions ଶܶ  and ଷܶ  in 
Equation (7) is shown as follows ( {−ܤ}  is the identical 
element): 
 
෠ܶଶ,ଷ = ଶܶ + ଷܶ 
= {−ܤ, +ܦ}௏±୼௩ + {−ܤ, +ܧ}௏±୼௩ 
= {[−ܤ]ଶ௏±୼௩ , [+ܦ, +ܧ]௏±୼௩}. 
(9) 
The summary of the initial six transactions with the 
aggregation operation is then calculated as: 
෍ T୩
଺
୩ୀଵ
= {[−ܣ]ଶ௏±୼௩ , [+ܤ − ܤ]ଶ௏±୼௩, [+ܦ, +ܧ]௏±୼௩} 
            +{[−ܣ]ଶ௏±୼௩ , [+ܥ − ܥ]ଶ௏±୼௩ , [+ܨ, +ܩ]௏±୼௩} 
        = {[−ܣ]ଶ௏±୼௩ , [+ܦ, +ܧ]௏±୼௩} 
            +{[−ܣ]ଶ௏±୼௩, [+ܨ, +ܩ]௏±୼௩} 
 
Re-organizing the remaining positions, we can get 
 
{[−ܣ, +ܦ]௏±୼௩ , [−ܣ, +ܧ]௏±୼௩} 
+{[−ܣ, +ܨ]௏±୼௩ , [−ܣ, +ܩ]௏±୼௩} 
(10) 
It is obvious from the result: to balance the remaining position, 
four more transactions are required as: 
 
଻ܶ = {+ܣ, −ܦ}௏±୼௩, ଼ܶ = {+ܣ, −ܧ}௏±୼௩, 
ଽܶ = {+ܣ, −ܨ}௏±୼௩, ଵܶ଴ = {+ܣ, −ܩ}௏±୼௩. 
(11) 
Adding the transactions in Equation (11) to the remaining 
positions in Equation (10), the summary of the transactions is 
changed to zero. Again, if illustrating ଻ܶ, … , ଵܶ଴ in Fig. 4(a), 
the basic tree topology is actually updated with four loop paths 
(illustrated as the dotted lines in Fig. 4(c)) connecting the 
“leaf” with the “root”. 
Consequently, to construct a wash trade, the traders in a 
tree topological network have to either bi-directionally transact 
under the tree hierarchy connection or trade with loop paths 
connecting the “root” and “leaf” nodes together. However, 
both formats implicitly change the tree topology to a 
combination of ring topologies with either two traders as Fig. 
5(a) or multiple traders as Fig. 5(b). 
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(a)                                 (b) 
Fig. 5 (a) Tree topology of seven traders with bi-directional paths equals 
to six “2-trader” ring topologies; (b) Tree topology of seven traders with 
loop paths equal to four “3-trader” ring topologies. 
 
4) Mesh topology 
Mesh topology is a fully connected network, in which each 
node is connected to each other as shown in Fig. 6. The fully 
connected network is usually viewed as hybrid network of ring 
and star topology [9] [10]. Therefore, a wash trade conducted 
by the traders in a mesh topological network also follows the 
analysis of ring and start topology in Section III.A.1) and 
III.A.2). 
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Fig. 6 Mesh transaction topology with seven traders. 
As a conclusion, ring topology with one or more traders is 
the basic structure of the collusive network in wash trade 
regardless of the complexity of the network, which might be a 
combination of two or more other topologies. The ring 
topology can also be observed graphically from the figures: 
only the transactions with loopback flows (both sale and 
purchase) are possible to constitute a wash trade. This also 
conforms to the wash trade condition, no changes in beneficial 
interest of each party, which is formulated in our analysis 
as  ∑ ௞ܶ௡௞ୀଵ = {0} , where  ݊ is the number of collusive 
transactions. 
Hence, we choose the ring topology as the indicator of a 
wash trade action: detecting a certain collection of 
transactions  ܵ  so that  ∑ ௞ܶ௞∈ௌ = {0} , triggers a wash trade 
alert. 
B. Wash trade detection 
1) Wash trade detection algorithm 
Based on the formulation of wash trade topology in Section 
III.A, the wash trade detection can be formulated as follows: 
we are given  ܭ  transactions,  ௞ܶ = ൛ݐ௜, ݐ௝ൟ௏ೖ±୼௩, ݇ = 1, … , ܭ 
where  ݐ௜  and  ݐ௝  represent traders and  ௞ܸ ± Δݒ is the traded 
volume in transaction  ݇  ( Δݒ is the matching margin). We 
would like to select a subset ܵ of the transactions so that the 
summary  ܹ  of the transactions is zero  ܹ = ∑ ௞ܶ௞∈ௌ = {0} . 
The number of transactions in the subset ܵ is ݊ (݊ ∈ [1, ܭ]). 
In essence, the formulated problem is a practical case of a 
more general problem called the Knapsack Problem [11] [12] 
[13]. The name Knapsack refers to the problem of filling a 
knapsack of capacity ܹ as full as possible using a subset of ݊ 
items {1, … , ݊}. The wash trade problem can be viewed as a 
special format of the Knapsack Problem: filling a knapsack of 
capacity ܹ using a subset ܵ of ݊ transactions ௞ܶ , each having 
negative or positive capacity (e.g. {+ܣ} and {−ܣ}), to make 
W=0, where the calculations of the transaction ௞ܶ are defined 
in equations (3), (4) and (8) and can be easily implemented by 
operator overloading in C++. The subset  ܵ  is considered a 
trading collusion in a wash trade. 
Because of the similarity of the two problems, the widely 
used approach for solving the Knapsack Problem [11] [12] 
[13], dynamic programming, is deployed for the wash trade 
detection problem. The main principles of dynamic 
programming is that: we have to come up with a number of 
sub-problems so that each sub-problem can be solved easily 
from “smaller” sub-problems, and the solution of the original 
problem can be obtained easily once we know the solutions to 
all the sub-problems [14]. 
To solve the special form of the Knapsack Problem under K 
transactions and capacity W, denoting the final subset of 
transactions in an optimum solution for the original problem as 
ܵ௄ , we then use the notation OPT(K,W) to denote the summary 
of the transactions in the subset  ܵ  as OPT(K,W) = 
min ห∑ ௞ܶ௞∈ௌ಼ ห. To find out OPT(K,W), we not only need the 
solution of OPT(K-1,W), but also need to know OPT(K-1,ܹ − T୏), 
the best solution on the first K-1 transactions {1, … , K − 1} and 
the remaining capacity W-T୏: if ௄ܶis not one of the transactions 
in the final subset ܵ௄, we can simply ignore the transaction K 
and find out OPT(K-1,W); but if ௄ܶis, we need to seek an optimal 
solution in the remaining transactions  1, … , ܭ − 1 , which is 
OPT(K-1,W- ௄ܶ).  Therefore, the recursion is summarized as 
1) If ௄ܶ ∉ ܵ௄ , then OPT(K,W)=OPT(K-1,W); 
2) If ௄ܶ ∈ ܵ௄ , then OPT(K,W)= ௄ܶ+OPT(K-1,W- ௄ܶ). 
We are therefore going to use many sub-problems: one for 
each set  {1, … , i} (i = K, K − 1, … ,1) of the transactions and 
each possible remaining available capacity w. Hence, the 
summary of the transactions in subset ௜ܵ of the optimal solution 
using transactions  {1, … , ݅}  with the allowed capacity w is 
denoted as OPT(i,w) = min  ห∑ ௞ܶ௞∈ௌ೔ ห  where the capacity w 
satisfies ∑ ௞ܶ௞∈ௌ೔ = ݓ. Using this set of sub-problems, we will 
be able to express the value OPT(i,w) as a simple expression in 
terms of values from smaller problems. This recursive process 
is re-organized based on the above two conditions to give 
Algorithm 1, where array T is the given transactions. This 
recursive algorithm can be used by simply invoking OPT(K,W) 
for K transactions and the capacity W. 
Algorithm 1 Wash trade detection algorithm. 
1 ܶ = [ ଵܶ, … , ௄ܶ]; // original K transactions; 
2 ܵ = ∅;  // solution subset, initialized to empty; 
3 OPT( ݅ , w ) // i starts from K and decreases on each recursion step; 
4     if  ݅<0 // if i reaches the last one, 
5         return; // then return; 
6     if ௜ܶ = ݓ // if ௜ܶ = w, the orders in S is one solution; 
7         output ܵ, ௜ܶ;  // output the found solution; 
8     push ௜ܶ into ܵ; // assume ௜ܶ ∈ ܵ,  
9     OPT(i-1,w- ௜ܶ);  // recursively find solution by condition 2); 
10     pop ௜ܶ out ܵ; // assume ௜ܶ ∉ ܵ, 
11     OPT(i-1,w); // recursively find solution by condition 1); 
12 end of OPT;  
13 return ܵ;  
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2) Pre-organizing: volume bucketing 
To apply the algorithm on the detection problem in a 
practical context, we need to pre-organize the transaction 
records. As we discussed before, the transactions in wash trade 
have “nearly identical” (ܸ ± Δݒ) traded volumes, otherwise, 
some traders in the collusive network would incur a loss or 
face unnecessary risk, which is not accepted by the 
manipulators. Therefore, we argue that for detecting the wash 
trade, the traded volume is a more relevant metric to sort the 
transaction records than the physical time, although the 
transactions are usually recorded as a time sequence. In 
essence, the sorting involves splitting trading sessions into 
blocks of traded volume for the purpose of detecting the 
potential collusions in each interval. 
However, the original trading records are not appropriate 
for the sorting due to large masses of trading noises from the 
active speculators issuing large number of small orders in one 
single day, which makes the transaction sequence in a mess. 
The wash trade is to manipulate the trading volume, the orders 
with tiny sizes from the noise traders are surely not within the 
detection scope. According to the empirical studies in [7], the 
traders involved in the volume manipulations (e.g. wash trade) 
of one certain stock usually do not trade legitimately within a 
certain time period which is usually one trading day. That 
means if trader “A” and “B” are manipulators of a wash trade, 
there is a little chance that they also trade normally on the same 
stock within one trading day. Therefore, we aggregate the 
transactions with at least one identical “signed trader” as 
defined in equation (8) and then set up the volume buckets for 
sorting the transactions into different volume buckets. The 
detection process in Algorithm 1 will be applied within each 
bucket separately. 
Table 3 WASH TRADE TRANSACTION EXAMPLE IN TREE 
TOPOLOGY WITH LOOP PATHS 
Transaction Seller Buyer Volume ID Time 
1 09:00:00 A B 2000 ± Δv 
2 09:25:00 B D 1000 ± Δv 
3 09:45:00 B E 1000 ± Δv 
4 11:25:00 D A 1000 ± Δv 
5 15:25:00 E A 1000 ± Δv 
6 16:00:00 A C 2000 ± Δv 
7 16:00:00 C F 1000 ± Δv 
8 16:00:00 C G 1000 ± Δv 
9 16:00:00 F A 1000 ± Δv 
10 16:00:00 G A 1000 ± Δv 
 
Table 3 illustrates the transaction examples in a tree 
topology with loop paths as shown in Fig. 4(c). Based on the 
calculation in equation (8), the trading records can be 
aggregated as: 
෠ܶଵ,଺ = ଵܶ + ଺ܶ = {[−ܣ]ସ଴଴଴ , [+ܤ , +ܥ]ଶ଴଴଴}, 
෠ܶଶ,ଷ = ଶܶ + ଷܶ = {[−ܤ]ଶ଴଴଴ , [+ܦ , +ܧ]ଵ଴଴଴}, 
෠ܶସ,ହ = ସܶ + ହܶ = {[−ܦ, −ܧ]ଵ଴଴଴ , [+ܣ]ଶ଴଴଴}, 
෠ܶ଻,଼ = ଻ܶ + ଼ܶ = {[−ܥ]ଶ଴଴଴ , [+ܨ , +ܩ]ଵ଴଴଴}, 
෠ܶଽ,ଵ଴ = ଽܶ + ଵܶ଴ = {[−ܨ, −ܩ]ଵ଴଴଴ , [+ܣ]ଶ଴଴଴}. 
The buckets are selected as  [1000, 4000]  based on the 
aggregated traded volumes. By this, the trading records 
(orders) are reorganized and pre-filtered by the aggregated 
trading volumes and then Algorithm 1 will be applied on the 
volume buckets for detecting the potential wash trade 
collusion. 
The analogous volume buckets approach is also used in 
financial market volatility analysis [15]. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
Evaluating a detection algorithm usually relies on real data 
of both “normal” and “abuse” cases. However, due to the 
limited reports of wash trade manipulation and regulatory rules 
prohibiting the disclosure of illegitimate market data, the 
availability of the examples of wash trade in capital market is 
more limited than that of routine normal trading records. Due 
to the absence of real market wash trade cases, it is acceptable 
to the financial industry business that all the characteristic 
patterns of wash trade examples are studied and then 
reproduced in other financial data context to synthesize 
artificial manipulation cases [16]. Synthetic exploratory 
financial data are also accepted in academia for evaluating the 
proposed algorithm when real market data are hard to collect 
[5] [17] [18]. Thus in this approach, the wash trade scenarios 
are synthetically generated following the analysis in Section III 
and injected in other real normal trading transaction streams. 
The experimental data used in this work involves real 
market data of four stocks including Google (GOOG), 
Microsoft (MSFT), Intel (INTC) and Apple (AAPL) from 
NASDAQ. These datasets are selected due to their active 
trading activities, relatively high trading volumes and more 
volatile price fluctuation, the factors that might increase the 
likelihood of market abuse across the exchanges [19] [1]. The 
datasets, obtained from LOBSTER project [20], covers 
transactions over five trading days 11th -15th June 2012 and 
consists of more than 400,000 records. 
The typical wash trade scenarios are reproduced within 
each stock context. The scenarios are reproduced according to 
the five topological structures: single trader (as Fig. 1), ring (as 
Fig. 2), star (as Fig. 3) and tree (with bi-directional and loop 
path as Fig. 4 middle and right). One hundred wash trade 
examples are generated for each topology respectively and 
each example comprises of a number of transactions. Thus 
5*100=500 wash trade examples are synthetically generated 
and injected to the normal transaction records of the 
corresponding stocks making the test data a mixture of both 
“normal” and “wash trade” patterns. 
The performance evaluation of the proposed algorithm is 
based on two popular statistical measures: sensitivity (SEN) 
and specificity (SPE). Both of them are based on the confusion 
matrix, where false positive, FP, is defined as wash trade cases 
detected as normal and false negative, FN, is defined as normal 
cases detected as a wash trade, true positive, TP, is defined as 
normal cases detected as normal and true negative, TN, is 
defined as wash trade cases detected as wash trade. The 
sensitivity, defined as SEN = TP /( TP + FN), represents the 
rate of correctly detecting normal trading orders while the 
specificity, defined as SPE = TN /( TN+FP), refers to the rate 
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of precisely figuring wash trade cases. The sensitivity and 
specificity measure across four stocks with injected wash trade 
examples are illustrated in Table 4.  
Table 4 SENSITIVITY AND SPECIFICITY OF FOUR STOCKS FROM 
NASDAQ WITH INJECTED WASH TRADE CASES 
stock specificity   sensitivity 
GOOG 100.00% 99.96% 
MSFT 100.00% 99.86% 
INTC 100.00% 99.20% 
AAPL 100.00% 99.94% 
 
The specificity values show that in the datasets of four 
stocks, the injected wash trade collusive transactions are all 
successfully detected by the proposed algorithm. However, the 
sensitivity values vary across different stocks. The stock INTC 
achieves the lowest value as 99.20%. After carefully checking 
the false negative cases (normal cases detected as a wash trade) 
in INTC dataset, we found that there are a number of 
transactions between certain traders across different days as 
two examples shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 FALSE NEGATIVE TRANSACTIONS OF STOCK INTC 
case # time (US Easter) volume seller ID buyer ID 
1 11/06/2012 16:29:55 13559 CLIENT12 CLIENT3 12/06/2012 10:53:54 13356 CLIENT3 CLIENT12 
2 14/06/2012 16:00:51 18328 CLIENT8 COLLINSS 15/06/2012 09:29:08 18300 COLLINSS CLIENT8 
 
In case #1, the trader CLIENT12 sold 13559 shares to 
CLIENT3 at market closing time and bought 13356 shares 
back on the next morning. The traders CLIENT8 and 
COLLINSS traded similarly with nearly identical volumes 
(18328 and 18300 shares). Although not reported by 
regulators, the two cases are very analogous to wash trade 
based on the existing regulatory rules from FSA and CESR, 
which though do not indicate the timing features (inter-day or 
intra-day) of wash trade. Given the facts that the reported wash 
trade cases usually occurred as an intra-day trading and there is 
also no theoretical study and regulatory rules on the trading 
time of the wash trade, it is extremely hard to determine the 
legality of the false negative cases by the proposed algorithm, 
which rather aims at triggering alerts about suspicious 
collusive transactions.  
V. CONCLUSION 
A wash trade activity detection algorithm is proposed in 
this paper. To derive the algorithm, the collusive activities in 
the wash trade are analysed by using four network topologies: 
ring, star, tree and mesh. The analysis demonstrates the ring 
topology as the basic structure of the transactions in a wash 
trade. Based on the analysis, a recursive algorithm is proposed 
addressing the detection problem. The algorithm is applied on 
the aggregated and volume-sorted transaction sequences. The 
experimental evaluations, conducted on the trading records of 
four real stocks with injected synthetic wash trade transactions, 
show the effectiveness of the algorithm. 
Some false negative cases showed the wash trade features 
but occurred across two trading days. From the detection 
model’s perspective, those false negative cases can be easily 
bypassed by setting up the detection time period to be one 
single trading day. However, this requires more empirical or 
theoretical studies on the time characteristics of wash trade, 
which is a major issue that requires more future investigations. 
In recent years, the wash trade manipulation tends to be 
carried out in more than one exchange market by some tricky 
manipulators. Detection within any single market hardly 
achieves a complete and accurate result. This requires a cross-
market detection model, which is one of our primary future 
works. 
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